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Attitudes towards homosexuality have changed substantially in many countries, but vast 
differences remain globally, especially along religious lines. Many immigrants to Europe 
originate from countries with greater opposition to homosexuality, and it is examined here to 
what extent this influences their attitudes, and whether changes occur within and across 
generations. Using European Social Survey data, this study shows that socialisation in the 
origin country impacts attitudes long after migration, but that acculturation takes place both 
within the first generation and for the children of migrants. Evidence also shows that 










With European countries becoming increasingly diverse in terms of the origins and religious 
backgrounds of their populations (OECD, 2008), questions emerge about the attitudes and 
values of immigrants and their descendants who often come from countries with very 
different value orientations (Norris and Inglehart, 2012). This study focuses on attitudes 
towards homosexuality as one aspect of cultural integration that has already led to significant 
controversy between immigrant and local communities, in particular in the Netherlands, the 
most tolerant European country in this regard (Widmer el al., 1998). Globally, public opinion 
on homosexuality differs widely across countries, as do legal frameworks that range from 
declaring it illegal, to institutionalising it in the form of gay marriage. The trend in Western 
countries has been in the direction of greater liberalisation in both policies and attitudes, and 
can be understood as part of ‘a wider transformation in the meaning and organization of sex 
more generally, involving a shift in the locus of sexuality from the family to the individual, 
and a shift in the purpose of sex from procreation to pleasure’ (Frank and McEneaney, 1999: 
914). Yet, large differences between countries persist (see for example Gerhards 2010; Jackle 
and Wenzelburger, 2011; Stulhofer and Rimac, 2009), and Inglehart Norris (2003) go as far 
as to argue that the ‘true clash of civilisations’ is evident in relation to attitudes about gender 
and sexuality rather than political values and democracy. Does this ‘clash’ over cultural 
values also occur within European societies? Or do migrants adopt the host country beliefs 
and discard those of the origin country? 
Despite the relevance of the issue of cultural integration of migrants from increasingly 
diverse origins for social cohesion in Europe, there has been relatively little research that 
studies the attitudes of immigrants systematically. Examining the specific case of attitudes 
towards homosexuality allows not only to gain a better understanding of acculturation 
processes amongst immigrants, but also contributes to the discussion whether cultural values 
are primarily individual  traits or largely dependent on the society an individual lives in 
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(Norris and Inglehart, 2012). Both broader cultural contexts  and individual factors – 
especially religious denomination and religiosity - have been identified as important in 
shaping public opinions on homosexuality (Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009, Sherkat et al., 2011, 
Van den Akker et al., 2012; Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay, 2007). Studies in the United States 
for example have found that homosexuality appears to be more strongly stigmatised amongst 
Latino and Black communities (Lewis, 2003; Marín, 2003), but that much of these effects 
disappear when religion is accounted for (Negy and Eisenman, 2005; Schulte and Battle, 
2004; Sherkat et al., 2010). Within Europe, there is evidence that immigrants, and especially 
those of Muslim faith, hold less favourable attitudes than the native population, which is 
largely claimed to be due to different religious beliefs and more conservative origin country 
background (Gerhards, 2010; Lubbers et al., 2009; Simon, 2008; Stulhofer and Rimac, 2009; 
Van der Akker et al., 2012). Yet none of these studies go further to support this assumed 
importance of the origin country context and do not attempt to disentangle it from the impact 
of religion. Here, by including data of both immigrants and natives from 27 host and 186 
origin countries in a multiple origin and destination design (see Van Tubergen, 2005), 
individual effects, and especially religious denomination and religiosity, are analysed 
together with origin country effects to determine their relative importance. 
  A second question emerges from this: if migrants are indeed influenced by their origin 
country and religious beliefs, to what extent is this maintained amongst longer staying 
migrants and their children? Assimilation theory predicts that immigrants gradually adopt the 
ways of life and associated beliefs in the host society (Alba and Nee, 2003), while others 
suggest that minorities attempt to maintain the value systems of the origin country and 
transmit their beliefs to the next generation and are particularly reluctant to change their 
cultural values (Idema and Phalet, 2007).  Previous research on aspects of cultural integration 
supports both views to an extent. For example the views of Muslim migrants on gender 
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equality, sexual liberalization, democratic and religious values are located about half way 
between those of the population in the origin country and that of the host country (Norris and 
Inglehart, 2012). Similarly, it has been shown that acculturation plays a role both within the 
first generation and between generations in relation to gender role attitudes (Leaper and 
Valin, 1996; Yamanaka and McClelland, 1994), generalised trust (Dinesen and Hooghe, 
2010) and conservative values orientations (Röder and Mühlau, 2012).  This study aims to 
contribute to this debate by providing evidence for the level of intra- and inter-generational 
acculturation in relation to homosexuality, which has become more central in debates about 
the (lack of) socio-cultural integration of migrants. 
 
Culture and religion: what shapes migrants’ attitudes towards homosexuality? 
As Greenberg (1988) notes, ‘sexual culture is not universal to the human species’ (p.25). At 
the same time, practices around gender and sexuality are some of the most fundamental parts 
of a society’s normative system (Bourdieu, 2001), and it is therefore unsurprising that they 
have become the centre of disputes about immigrants’ cultural integration. While evidence of 
homosexual behaviours can be found across many societies throughout history, there are 
large differences in its role and perception, which interact with broader social, political and 
family structures. The current narrative of ‘modern’ European values of liberalism and 
tolerance often ignores the long history of repression of homosexuality, and the only quite 
recent decriminalisation and more widespread acceptance of homosexual relationships among 
Europeans publics (Greenberg, 1988). While social tolerance is often associated with 
modernisation and a ‘post-materialist’ cultural shift towards individualism and self-
expression, as well as a move away from religious authority towards secularism (Inglehart, 
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1987, 1990, 1997), this ignores historical variations and shifting interpretations even within 
the same religious traditions (Boswell, 1980). 
Despite this, it is clear that profound changes have taken place in relation to the 
perception of homosexuality in recent decades, and many Western European countries now 
support gay rights and allow gay marriage or civil unions. However, attitudes continue to 
differ even within Europe, with Eastern European countries remaining less supportive. 
Globally, even larger differences can be observed, and in many of the world regions where 
immigrants to Europe originate from, attitudes are comparatively unfavourable, and 
homosexuality may even be illegal or carry the death penalty (Gerhards, 2010; Stulhofer and 
Rimac, 2009).  
In this context, the role of religion is particularly prominent, as religious beliefs tend 
to be strongly tied up with more general prejudices, even if religious scripture does not 
necessarily support such prejudices (Boswell, 1980). The public debate in Europe focuses 
largely on Islam, which is often associated with a strong maintenance of patriarchal norms. 
As Al-Haqq Kugle (2010) discusses, the Qur’an itself does not explicitly express disapproval 
of homosexuality, though many later texts, as well as the sharia, do indeed stigmatise and 
criminalise homosexual relationships. This has become the dominant interpretation of 
scripture in many parts of the Muslim world, and is used to justify culturally embedded 
homophobia. Or, as Habib (2010, p. xl) notes, Islam does not condemn homosexuality, but 
Muslims generally do. Notwithstanding the focus on Islam in this context, other world 
religions similarly sanction homosexuality, if to varying degrees (Olson et al., 2006). Boswell 
(1980) argues that while there is little to suggest that Christian scripture is strongly concerned 
with homosexuality, or that early Christianity condemned it, Christian churches stigmatised 
homosexuality for centuries and are only now gradually opening up, with Eastern Orthodox 
remaining very conservative in this regard (Turcescu and Stan, 2005). 
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Previous research supports the important role of religion in shaping attitudes, both on 
the individual and the societal level (Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; Finke and Adamczyk, 2008; 
Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay, 2007). Those belonging to a religion and displaying greater 
levels of religiosity are less tolerant regarding homosexuality than those who do not consider 
themselves part of a religious group or are more loosely affiliated (Brewer, 2003; Francoeur 
and Noonan, 2004). Furthermore there are differences between religious denominations, and 
Muslims appear to condemn homosexuality most strongly (Finke and Adamczyk, 2008; 
Gerhards, 2010; Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay, 2007). Despite the complexities of 
homosexuality in Islam discussed above, the general view in the Western world is that 
homophobia and gender discrimination more generally are deeply engrained in Islamic 
culture. This, on the other hand, makes it easy for those that oppose more liberal views to 
dismiss any attempt to re-evaluate the religion’s stance on sexuality as Western imperialism 
(Habib, 2010; p.xxvi). As Zanghellini (2010) notes, ‘homosexuality has become one of the 
principal battlegrounds over which normative contemporary Western identity and its Muslim 
counterpart are being enacted and consolidated’ (p.269). These broader debates are 
particularly relevant when looking at Muslims living in Western countries, where 
homosexuals increasingly gain recognition and are more and more vocal about demanding 
equal rights where they do not already enjoy them. In this context, then, attitudes towards 
homosexuality signify much broader questions about the approval of Western norms and 
values that are often placed in stark opposition to migrants’ own traditions and beliefs.  
The above discussion shows how religion and culture are strongly interwoven, 
particularly in relation to moral norms, which is also corroborated in cross-national research 
(Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009; Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay, 2007). While immigrants on the one 
hand tend to maintain their religious orientation, and are indeed often more religious than the 
European public (Van Tubergen and Sindradottir, 2011), their more conservative attitudes 
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may equally stem from their origin cultures more broadly. Many migrants will have spent 
their formative, or ‘impressionable’ years abroad (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991), which can 
have a lasting effect on their attitudes. With most immigrants in Europe arriving from 
countries with less permissive attitudes towards homosexuality, they can be expected to be 
overall less tolerant than natives. Those from countries with relatively little difference in 
attitudes compared to the host country will have more supportive attitudes than those from 
countries where public support for homosexuality is comparatively much lower.  
H1: Immigrants hold more negative attitudes towards homosexuality than natives, 
and this gap is greater for immigrants from countries with more negative public 
opinion compared to the host country. 
While it is not possible to fully disentangle what part of a particular religious group’s 
attitudes are explained by religion itself, and what part by more general cultural aspects, the 
multiple origin design allows us to analyse origin country factors separately from religious 
denomination. With much of the literature discussed above noting the more negative attitudes 
of Muslims, and to a lesser extent Eastern Orthodox Christians, we can expect similar 
patterns amongst migrants. More important, however, is the extent to which such differences 
can be explained by individual characteristics, particularly religiosity, and origin country 
public opinion as a proxy for the general societal norms immigrants were socialised into. If 
socialisation in a less permissive culture is one of the core explanations for attitudes, then it 
may, together with demographic differences and varying levels of religious commitment 
explain religious differences (Hypothesis 2a). Alternatively, immigrants may attempt, more 
or less successfully, to maintain aspects of their origin culture, particularly when confronted 
with the normative expectations of the host culture that, as discussed above, are posited as 
opposite to their own, and religion could be an important vehicle for this (Connor, 2010). In 
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this case, religious differences would not only persist when controls are introduced, but 
remain across generations (Hypothesis 2b). 
H2a: Religious differences between migrants are explained by demographic 
differences, individual level religiosity and origin country public opinion. 
H2b: Religious differences between migrants remain across generations after 
controlling for demographic differences, individual level religiosity and origin 
country public opinion. 
 
Acculturation of attitudes within and across generations? 
Alba and Nee (2003) refer to assimilation as the ‘decline of an ethnic distinction and its 
corollary cultural and social differences’. Acculturation is related to this, and specifically 
refers to the adoption of cultural pattern of mainstream society, such as attitudes and norms 
(Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver, 2007). It is often understood that cultural traits are 
relatively stable once they have been formed early in life, and that generational change 
accounts for shifts in attitudes. This is well documented in relation to gender roles 
(Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004; Pampel 2011; Scott et al., 1996), where cohort substitution 
rather than changes within cohorts explain the increasingly more egalitarian attitudes 
observed in many countries amongst the general population. For homosexuality, both intra- 
and inter-cohort changes have been shown to be of importance (see Baunach, 2011 for the 
United States). In relation to immigrants, this is particularly relevant, as this would suggest 
that first generation immigrants will not only be strongly shaped by the context in which they 
were socialised in the origin country, but will maintain this at least to some extent when 
living in a comparatively more tolerant host society.  
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Their children, on the other hand, can be expected to be more strongly influenced by 
the host country, by being exposed to the culture of mainstream society during their 
impressionable years. Socialisation theory suggests that primary socialisation in the family 
succeeds in transmitting parental attitudes to children, and this has been shown to be the case 
for example in relation to political (Jennings, 1984) and gender role attitudes (Kulik, 2002). 
In a study of young people in Brussels, Teney and Subramanian (2010) find that the second 
generation held greater levels of sexual prejudice than the children of natives. However, 
secondary socialisation outside of the family is also important, and education appears to be 
the main driver of more tolerant attitudes in the context of homosexuality in particular (Van 
der Meerendonck and Scheepers, 2004). While parents may attempt to maintain ethnic 
identities and uphold cultural values by sheltering their offspring from exposure (Portes and 
Rumbaut, 2001), this appears to be only partially successful in transmitting traditional values, 
such as gender role attitudes (Read, 2003). Therefore, it is expected that second generation 
migrants will be overall more supportive of homosexuality than first generation migrants due 
to their greater contact with the host country in their impressionable years; additionally, 
public opinion in the origin country will influence their attitudes less strongly than those of 
their parents’ generation.  
H3: Second generation migrants hold more positive attitudes towards homosexuality 
than first generation migrants; the difference in origin and host country public 
opinion has a weaker effect on their attitudes than those of the first generation. 
Despite the importance of early years in attitude formation, exposure to different kinds of 
values may lead to changes already within one generation. For attitudes towards 
homosexuality, some change within age cohorts has been documented for Canada and the 
United States (Andersen and Fetner, 2008; Baunach, 2011). For immigrants, learning about 
the host country and to some extent adopting its beliefs is part of the process of acculturation, 
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although this can be selective across different domains (Berry, 1997). Within-generation 
change amongst migrants has been well documented in relation to gender roles (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2009; Leaper and Valin, 1996; Yamanaka and McClelland, 1994). Similarly, for 
attitudes towards homosexuality, Ahrold and Meston (2010) show that greater acculturation 
in other domains is indicative of more permissive attitudes towards homosexuality amongst 
Hispanic and Asian groups in the United States, a finding that is corroborated by Luu and 
Bartsch (2011) for Vietnamese migrants. Length of residence in the host country is therefore 
expected to be linked to more tolerant attitudes. Similarly, the differential between host and 
origin country attitudes should lose salience over time. 
H4: First generation immigrants who have been in the country for longer have more 
tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality than their more recently arrived 
counterparts; the effect of the host-origin differential in attitudes weakens with longer 
residence in the host country. 
 
Data and methodology 
Data was extracted from Rounds 1 to 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS) collected 
biannually from 2002 to 2008. The ESS is a high quality cross-national dataset that covers a 
wide range of European countries and is designed for comparative analyses. It has a sample 
that approximates a simple random sample and comparatively high response rates
1
. Data 
from 27 out of the 33 countries covered by these four rounds of the survey were pooled so 
that the dataset includes the EU15 countries plus 9 New Member States (Bulgaria, Czech 
                                                             
1 Target effective response rates of 70 per cent are specified for each country. While this is not achieved for all 




Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia), plus the 
EFTA states Iceland, Norway and Switzerland
2
. 
It should be noted that while the ESS is not a migrant survey, it offers the advantage 
of including natives as a comparison group, as well as including information on origin 
countries of the respondent and the parents. The subdivision between second generation 
migrants with two and only one foreign born parent is important, as the latter are rarely 
included in research of migrants. On the other hand, some migrants may be underrepresented, 
in particular less well integrated groups who may have lower likelihoods of participating in 
the study. These groups could be expected to be more traditional in their beliefs, so that the 
gap between migrants and natives may be underestimated as a consequence.  
 
Dependent variable 
Only one item in the ESS measures attitudes towards homosexuality across all rounds of the 
survey. Respondents were asked to rate their answer on a five point scale from ‘strongly 
agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ to the statement ‘gay men and lesbians should be free to live 
their own life as they wish’. While it is somewhat limiting to have only one item, the ESS is 
currently the only survey that allows a cross-national analysis and the inclusion of origin 
country characteristics. It should be noted, however, that the classification of ‘homosexuals’ 
as a separate social category should not be taken for granted historically or cross-culturally 
(Boswell 1980), and that what is being referred to here should therefore be considered in the 
context of a particular way of perceiving homosexuality in Western societies. This, coupled 
                                                             
2 Only EU and EFTA countries were included, as they share important institutional characteristics and can be 
compared more straightforwardly, particularly in light of particular European discourses that prevail in relation 
to social tolerance. Data for Lithuania was not yet available at the time of analysis. Croatia was excluded as it 
was not possible to clearly determine migrant status as a consequence of its former membership of Yugoslavia; 
similarly Cyprus was excluded as its division, and the associated struggles over territorial sovereignty, have led 
to a lack of clarity of country of birth information. 
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with the normative link between Western identity and tolerance of homosexuality discussed 
above (Habib, 2010; Zanghellini, 2010), has as a consequence that agreement with this item 
is intrinsically linked with broader approval of Western lifestyles and values, often 
formulated in opposition particularly to Muslim beliefs, which needs to be considered 
carefully when interpreting findings. 
 
Independent variables 
Immigrant groups are defined firstly as four generational groups: those who themselves and 
whose parents were born in the country (‘natives’), those who themselves and whose parents 
were born abroad (‘first generation’), those whose parents were born abroad but who 
themselves were born in the residence country (‘second generation’) and lastly those who 
only have only ‘one foreign born parent’. Any cases that do not belong to these categories, or 
where details of the origin country were missing, were excluded from the analysis. Second 
generation migrants from the first round of the ESS had to be excluded, as this round did not 
include details of parents’ country of birth. The three immigrant groups are then further 
subdivided by religious denomination, which is based on a combination of two variables in 
the ESS: one that determines whether a respondent belongs to a religious denomination, and 
if so, which one. The categories of this variable include all respondents who indicated that 
they did not belong to a religion (‘no religion’), those that are ‘Catholic or Protestant’, 
‘Eastern Orthodox’ or ‘Muslim’, and lastly those who belong to any ‘other’ religion. A 
consequence of this approach is that the reference group is the ‘typical’ native regardless of 
religious denomination. Previous research has already well established the differences 
amongst the native population along religious lines (see for example Adamczyk and Pitt, 
2009; Brewer, 2003; Finke and Adamczyk, 2008; Francoeur and Noonan, 2004; Yuchtman-
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Yaar and Alkalay, 2007) so that this approach allows a more straightforward comparison of 
immigrant groups to an average native and a simpler presentation of results. 
Religiosity and attendance. Previous research has clearly shown that individual levels of 
religiosity and religious practice are important for attitudes on moral issues (Jaspers et al., 
2007; Scheepers et al., 2002; Van der Akker et al., 2012; Whitley, 2009). Religiosity needs to 
be controlled for in models, especially as differences observed by origin country and religious 
denomination may at least partially be due to the greater levels of religiosity amongst 
particular minority groups in Europe, as has been shown by Van Tubergen and Sindradottir 
(2011). Religiosity is based on self reported level on a zero to ten scale, while attendance, 
apart from special occasions, is measured as ‘weekly or more often’, ‘less than weekly’ and 
‘never’ (reference category) based on respondents’ own assessment, and prayer as ‘daily’, 
‘weekly’, ‘less than weekly’ or ‘never’ (reference category). 
Length of residence is an important variable to determine acculturation over time, and is 
measured here linearly in years. In the ESS, length of stay is coded into five categories (less 
than one year, one to 5 years, 6 to 10 years and 11 to 20 years and more than 20 years). These 
have been substituted by the mean value of each bracket (.5, 3, 8, 15.5 years) and 37.5 years 
for the top bracket
3
. While length of residence as a measurement of change over time is not 
ideal, and panel data would be preferential, it is unlikely that the full effect of length of 
residence is due to selectivity within the sample, as this would require earlier cohorts to have 
held systematically more tolerant attitudes.  
Differences in acceptance of homosexuality between host and origin country are based on 
World Value Survey data. The scores reflect the percentage of individuals who stated that 
                                                             
3 Checks indicated that the assumption of linearity is appropriate for the outcome variables, and that findings did 
not differ substantively in models that used either indicator. For easier interpretation, especially of interaction 




they would not like to have homosexuals as neighbours, reflecting the social distance towards 
homosexuals in a country. Data from 2006 or the closest year available is used. The 
difference between host and origin country is calculated for this variable. Using this indicator 
has the limitation that it does not cover all source countries for immigrants in Europe. 
However, with 12.8 percent for first generation, 7.6 percent for second generation and 4.6 
percent for respondents with one foreign born parent, the number of missing cases is 
relatively modest. Differentials between host and origin country in Human Development 
Indicators (UNDP, 2010) are used additionally as a proxy for level of modernisation of a 
country, which has been shown to be very strongly linked to attitudes towards homosexuality 
(Gerhards, 2010; Jackle and Wenzelburger, 2011; Stulhofer and Rimac, 2009). The HDI is 
made up of several components that include economic development (GDP), education and 
life expectancy, and has the advantage of covering a much wider range of countries than the 
WVS, so that far less than one percent of respondents with migration background have 
missing information on this variable. It is, however, a more indirect measurement of the 
difference in attitudes in the origin country, and cannot reflect religious and cultural divisions 
that may be at least to some extent independent of human development
4
.  
Control variables in the models are gender, age, education, income, marital status and place 
of residence. Men, older people, rural residents and those of lower socio-economic status 
have been shown consistently to be more opposed towards homosexuality (see for example 
Stulhofer and Rimac, 2009; Van der Akker et al., 2012). Gender is included as a dummy 
variable ‘female’, and age is measured in years. Education is measured as ‘primary’, ‘lower 
secondary’, ‘upper secondary’ and ‘tertiary’. Income is measured by the relative income 
                                                             
4
 While one strategy to address religious differences in the host country would have been the inclusion 
of origin country majority religion, or ‘religious zones’ (Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay, 2007), this was 




position within the relevant country of residence. Place of residence includes ‘rural’, ‘country 
village’, ‘town or small city’, ‘suburbs’ and ‘city’. Additionally, those who conform to a 
‘traditional’ model of partnership are expected to have lower levels of support for alternative 
lifestyles (Jackle and Wenzelburger, 2011). Marital status contains the categories ‘never 
married’, ‘divorced/separated’, ‘widowed’ and ‘married’. On the country level, Human 
Development Indicators were included to control for the differences between levels of host 
country contexts within Europe (Gerhards, 2010; Stulhofer and Rimac, 2009). Appendix one 
shows the distribution of these variables across the main immigrant groups. 
 
Modelling 
The data include individuals from 27 different countries, who differ in terms of their 
immigrant status and, in the case of immigrants, their origin country. Individuals are seen to 
be nested within communities within residence countries. Communities are defined by the 
combination of the origin and the host country, as well as generational status. For second 
generation migrants, the country of birth of the parent(s) is used to define the community. 
The variables required to test the hypotheses here, as well as the control variables, include 
those on the level of the host country (Human Development Index), the community level 
(difference between origin and host country) and the individual level (all other variables). 
Due to the nested structure of the data, hierarchical linear models with three levels are 
estimated using full maximum likelihood estimation (IGLS) in MLwiN 2.23. 
To allow comparison between natives and different migrant groups, all are included in 
the same model. There are 128,435 natives, 9,255 first generation, 1,914 second generation 
and 5,132 individuals with one foreign born parent in the dataset, with a total of 144,736 
cases at level 1. There are 2,021 communities at level 2, and 27 host country at the highest 
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level. The group sizes at level 2 vary from only one person in a particular host origin 
combination to 9,590 (native Germans), with an average of 72 per group. Linear models are 
estimated, with higher values indicating more positive attitudes
5
. Random intercepts were 
specified for higher levels, and random slopes for variables that are interacted with higher 
level predictors. Continuous variables were standardised with the exception of host-origin 
country differentials, as this allows a more meaningful comparison of subgroup differentials 
across models. All models are controlled for ESS round (not reported). 
 
Findings 
Immigrants’ attitudes compared 
Overall, only first generation immigrants are on average less accepting of homosexuality than 
natives, with no significant difference observed for the second generation (Model 1).  
Respondents with one foreign born parent appear to be even more supportive of 
homosexuality than a typical native. Models 5a and 5b should be examined for the effect of 
host and origin country differentials in public opinion on migrants’ attitudes. Models 5a and 
6a include the difference in attitudes based on World Value Survey (WVS) data, whereas 
Models 5b and 6b use the proxy of Human Development Indicators (HDI). Coefficients for 
both measurements show that first generation immigrants are strongly influenced by the 
origin country in the expected direction: the larger the difference in public opinion between 
host and origin country, the more negative their views on homosexuality. Effects are in the 
expected direction for second generation migrants, but remain far below conventional 
significance levels. This supports both parts of Hypothesis 1 for the first generation, but not 
for the second. 
                                                             
5 Ordered logistic models were also estimated, and results are highly comparable. 
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Table 1: Effects of generational status, religion and religiosity 
 
Model 1        Model 2        Model 3       Model 4       
 
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Intercept 3.672** .063 3.672** .098 3.662** .072 3.752** .069 
First generation -.226** .060 
          Catholic/Protestant 
  
-.225** .048 -.233** .051 -.124** .045 
    Orthodox 
  
-.268** .059 -.348** .061 -.275** .056 
    Muslim 
  
-.765** .058 -.817** .060 -.697** .055 
    Other 
  
-.483** .062 -.528** .063 -.368** .059 
    No religion 
  
 .038 .047 -.031 .050 -.105* .045 
Second generation -.001 .069 
          Catholic/Protestant 
  
-.041 .069 -.020 .071  .051 .066 
    Orthodox 
  
-.286** .096 -.320** .096 -.243** .091 
    Muslim 
  
-.374** .092 -.589** .093 -.421** .087 




 .123 -.002 .119 
    No religion 
  
 .227** .064  .117# .066  .033 .061 
One foreign born parent  .157* .062 
          Catholic/Protestant 
  
 .005 .050 -.023 .053  .041 .048 
    Orthodox 
  
-.038 .090 -.167# .090 -.114 .086 
    Muslim 
  
-.358# .189 -.620** .184 -.500** .179 
    Other 
  
-.225* .105 -.274** .103 -.126 .099 
    No religion 
  
 .321** .049  .205** .052  .101* .046 
Gender (ref: male)                      Female 
   
 .190** .006  .249** .006 
Age 
    
-.215** .004 -.177** .004 
Education (ref: lower sec.)        Primary 
   
-.143** .010 -.115** .010 
                                                      Upper secondary 
   
 .083** .008  .075** .008 
                                                      Tertiary 
   
 .210** .008  .209** .008 
Income 
    
 .035** .003  .030** .003 
Marital status (ref: married)    Never married 
   
 .043** .008  .030** .008 
                                                      Divorced/separated 
 
 .138** .010  .097** .010 
                                                     Widowed 
   
-.058** .011 -.041** .011 
Place of residence (ref: City)   Suburb 
   
-.028** .010 -.025* .010 
                                                     Town 
   
-.090** .008 -.078** .008 
                                                     Village 
   
-.163** .008 -.125** .008 
                                                     Rural 
   
-.205** .013 -.166** .013 
Religiosity 
      
-.079** .004 
Attendance (ref: never)          Weekly 
     
-.393** .011 
                                                    Less than weekly 
     
-.076** .007 
Prayer (ref: never)                   Daily 
     
-.108** .011 
                                                   Weekly 
     
-.017 .011 
                                                   Less than weekly 
     
-.006 .008 
Host country HDI 
    
 .268** .053  .265** .053 
Country level intercept  .223 .063  .216 .060  .084 .025  .083 .024 
Immigrant group intercept  .083 .008  .041 .005  .050 .006  .038 .005 
Individual level variance 1.175 .004 1.172 .004 1.077 .004 1.046 .004 
Log likelihood difference to previous model 388.13
a,b 
           539.69
a
        12240.05
a 
      4295.14
a 
Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05,**=p < .01, two-tailed; aChi-square test sig. at 99.9%; bCompared to empty model; 




Religious dividing lines? 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b make opposing predictions regarding the persistence of religious 
differences when controlling for demographic differences, religiosity and origin country 
context. In Model 2, attitudes of immigrants are analysed for each religious group, each time 
in comparison to a ‘typical native’. Model 3 then adds a range of control variables, to 
determine to what extent the different composition of these religious groupings accounts for 
the differences in attitudes. In Model 4, religiosity and religious attendance are introduced as 
further controls, to determine if it is individual religiosity and religious observance that 
determine outcomes rather than religious denomination and immigrant status. Lastly, origin 
country factors are controlled for in Models 5 and 6. 
Pronounced differences along religious lines can be observed: a first generation 
migrant with no religion does not differ significantly from the typical native, whereas all 
other first generation groups hold significantly less supportive attitudes towards 
homosexuality. These differences increase rather than decrease when control variables are 
introduced. When religiosity and attendance are controlled for, differences decline, but 
remain significant, and even those migrants who do not identify with a particular religious 
denomination are significantly less accepting of homosexuality compared to a similarly 
(un)religious native. The remaining difference is largest for Muslim first generation migrants, 
and this is not accounted for by demographic differences and only partially by individual 
religious commitment. 
Turning to the second generation, only Eastern Orthodox and Muslim migrants are 
significantly less supportive of homosexuality once demographic composition and individual 
level religiosity are controlled for. For other groups, there is either little difference overall, or 
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whatever difference there is appears to be due to different levels of religiosity. Amongst 
individuals with only one foreign born parent, those with no religion are again significantly 
more supportive than natives on average, and this remains significant with controls and 
accounting for levels of religiosity and attendance. Of those belonging to a religion, only 
Muslims are significantly less supportive than the average native when controls are included. 
The magnitude of this difference is roughly comparable to that for second generation 
migrants with two foreign born parents.  
Accounting for attitudinal differences in the origin country of first generation 
migrants using the WVS indicator fully accounts for the negative effect of being Catholic and 
Protestant or Eastern Orthodox migrant, and reverses the negative effect for those who do not 
belong to a religion. (Models 5a and 5b) For Muslims and the ‘other’ group, the effect 
reduces substantially, but remains highly significant. Amongst the second generation and 
those with one foreign born parent, only Muslims and Eastern Orthodox migrants were 
shown to hold more negative attitudes, and this is reduced to some extent by the inclusion of 
host-origin country differentials for those with two foreign born parents, but not for those 
with only one foreign born parent. The reduction in the effect of religious denomination is 
also weaker for the second generation than the first generation both in relative and in absolute 
terms. Using the HDI indicator, very similar patterns are observed overall, although the effect 
of being a first generation Eastern Orthodox migrant remains significant. Overall, this 
supports Hypothesis 2b more strongly than Hypothesis 2a: while religious group differences 
are partially explained by different demographic composition, the greater levels of religiosity 
of many migrants, and the impact of origin country socialisation, these factors cannot fully 
explain the less supportive attitudes of Eastern Orthodox, and particularly Muslim migrants, 
which persist even in the second generation. 




Model 5a (WVS) Model 5b (HDI) Model 6a (WVS) Model 6b (HDI) 
 
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Intercept 3.757** .067 3.756** .067 3.757** .065 3.756** .065 
First generation (Gen1) 
            Catholic/Protestant  .040 .041  .007 .042  .040 .038  .004 .039 
    Orthodox -.065 .054 -.139* .054 -.051 .052 -.132** .051 
    Muslim -.385** .057 -.463** .056 -.362** .055 -.448** .054 
    Other -.169** .057 -.188** .057 -.161** .054 -.185** .055 
    No religion  .076# .042  .023 .041  .082* .038  .025 .038 
Second generation (Gen 2) 
            Catholic/Protestant  .072 .064  .068 .064  .070 .060  .067 .061 
    Orthodox -.196* .093 -.210* .091 -.195* .089 -.210* .089 
    Muslim -.366** .109 -.369** .106 -.375** .106 -.378** .103 
    Other  .042 .124  .037 .125  .037 .122  .032 .123 
    No religion  .063 .063  .058 .062  .063 .059  .058 .058 
One foreign born parent (FBP) 
            Catholic/Protestant  .033 .043  .045 .044  .034 .039  .045 .040 
    Orthodox -.105 .082 -.098 .083 -.100 .080 -.093 .080 
    Muslim -.515** .181 -.482** .180 -.509** .179 -.477** .178 
    Other -.128 .097 -.117 .097 -.127 .095 -.117 .095 
    No religion  .090* .042  .105* .042  .094* .038  .109** .039 
Length of residence 
  
 .057** .022  .057** .021 
Dif. host-origin WVS Gen 1b -.673** .065 
  
-.653** .064 
          x length of residence  
  
 .135* .061 
 Dif. host-origin WVS Gen2 b -.148 .136 
  
-.149 .131 
   Dif. host origin WVS FBP b  .046 .095 
  
 .042 .091 





        x length of residence 
      
 .250* .112 










Country level intercept  .089 .026  .088 .025  .089 .025  .089 .025 
Group intercept  .024 .004  .026 .004  .017 .003  .019 .004 
Length-group slope 
    
-.000 .000 -.004 .004 
Individual level variance 1.046 .004 1.046 .004 1.045 .004 1.045 .004 
Log likelihood difference to Model 4    120.04
a 
       97.24
a 
       192.32
a 
         168.65
 a 
Reported selectively; same control variables included as in Model 4 in Table 1 
Significance levels #=p< .10, *=p < .05,**=p < .01, two-tailed; case numbers: n1= 144,736, n2=2,021, n3=27 
aChi-square test sig. at 99.9%; co-variances not reported; b Unstandardised coefficients 
Generational differences 
Hypothesis 3 anticipated that second generation migrants are more accepting of 
homosexuality than first generation migrants, and less strongly influenced by the origin 
country. As already summarised above, the first generation is less supportive of 
homosexuality, but this is not the case for the second generation when seen overall, and the 
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opposite seems to be true for respondents with one immigrant parent. The difference between 
first generation and the other two migrants groups is significant at the 99% level when based 
on Model 1. The descriptive Table (Appendix 1) shows that the second generation is overall 
younger and less likely to be married than the first generation, which may explain these 
differences. Yet, once the same control variables are introduced to Model 1 as in Model 3 
(not shown here), the second generation and respondents with one foreign born parent remain 
significantly more supportive than the first generation. However, the more tolerant attitudes 
of respondents with one foreign born parent in comparison to natives are largely explained by 
demographic differences. Closer examination of immigrants of different religious 
denominations (Models 2 to 4) also shows that for all religious subgroups, attitudes of the 
second generation are more positive compared to the equivalent first generation group, with 
the exception of Eastern Orthodox migrants, for whom attitudes of the children of two 
foreign born parents are very similar to those of the first generation. Models 5a and 5b should 
again be consulted for the effects of origin country on attitudes. No significant effect is found 
for the second generation, and the difference between the effect compared to the first 
generation is highly significant. Taken together, the data clearly confirm Hypothesis 3 in 
relation to inter-generational acculturation. 
 
Intra-generational acculturation 
For intra-generational acculturation, Hypothesis 4 states that longer stay in the host country is 
associated with more favourable attitudes, and a weaker influence of the origin country 
context. Models 6a and 6b should be consulted for length of stay effects and their interaction 
with the host-origin differential in public support for homosexuality; both show clearly that 
longer residence is associated with more supportive attitudes, and this coefficient is similar in 
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size and significance in a model without the interactions with the host-origin differential (not 
presented here). The interaction effect between length of residence and differences in host-
origin context for both indicators additionally shows that with longer residence this 
differential exerts a weaker influence on attitudes. This supports Hypothesis 4, in that intra-
generational acculturation occurs. These findings are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows 
how the size of the effect of WVS and HDI differentials decreases for first generation 
immigrants who have been in the country for different lengths of time and for the second 
generation. 




Conclusion and discussion 
Findings show that religiosity, generational status and origin country characteristics all 
contribute to explaining attitudes towards homosexuality amongst immigrants in Europe. 

































large extent because they come from countries with weaker support for homosexuality. 
Importantly, however, their opposition weakens with longer stay, partly because the origin 
country context appears to lose salience with longer residence in the host country. 
Additionally, the second generation is overall more supportive than the first, thus providing 
evidence for inter-generational acculturation in addition to intra-generational change. 
However, some differences between religious groups remain, suggesting that acculturation 
does not occur in a uniform way.  
Before turning to the more frequently studied first generation and the children of two 
foreign born parents, one group merits particular attention, as they exhibit a somewhat 
different pattern: the children of one foreign born parent are overall more accepting of 
homosexuality, even when compared to the average native
6
. Differences compared to the 
children of two migrants parents are perhaps unsurprising, in the sense that inter-marriage is 
one of the strongest indicators of social integration amongst immigrant groups (Gordon, 
1964), and children of mixed parents are generally better integrated socially than the 
offspring of same-ethnic parents (Kalmijn, 2010). Their parents are likely to have arrived at a 
younger age and not already in a relationship with another migrant. Additionally, there is 
likely to be a strong selection effect: the foreign born parent chose a partner from outside the 
ethnic group, demonstrating a greater level of social integration, while the native parent is 
likely to be more open-minded about otherness both as a cause and consequence of having a 
non-native partner. This may indeed explain the comparatively high levels of support 
amongst this group, who benefit from their integration into the mainstream at the same time 
as being more exposed to greater diversity within their own family.  Interestingly, however, 
those who are of Muslim faith in this group are as strongly opposed to homosexuality as their 
                                                             
6 It should be noted that the more tolerant attitudes compared to natives are partly the outcome of the low levels 
of religious belonging and religiosity amongst this group, and that those not belonging to a religion amongst the 
native population are similarly supportive of homosexuality. 
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peers with two foreign born parents. As we do not know the religious denomination of the 
parents, we can only speculate that the native born parent in such couples may indeed also be 
Muslim or at least favourably disposed towards Islam if they have a Muslim partner and 
brought up their child to be a Muslim despite the ‘bright’ boundaries that exist in Europe 
towards Islam (Alba, 2005). Further research may be able to shed light on this phenomenon, 
and explain the stronger maintenance of negative attitudes amongst this group.  
The overall more negative attitudes of Muslims across all generational groups confirm 
findings of previous studies (Gerhards, 2010; Simon, 2008; Stulhofer and Rimac, 2009; Van 
der Akker et al., 2012). Additionally, this study shows that Eastern Orthodox migrants and 
the heterogeneous ‘other’ group appear to have more negative attitudes as well, although this 
can to a large extent be explained by the origin country context
7
. For Muslims, on the other 
hand, a more complex story emerges: while acculturation occurs also for this group within
8
  
and across generations, a relatively large difference in attitudes remains. It may be that one 
generation has simply not been enough to bridge the relatively large initial gap, and that we 
will see further change in the future. On the other hand, the debate in Europe on the ‘cultural 
clash’ with its focus on Muslims in particular may actually be reinforcing divisions, leading 
to a greater preservation of particular cultural values amongst this group, as shown by Connor 
(2010) in relation to the greater maintenance of religiosity in more unfavourable countries. 
This is mirrored on the other side by identity politics that present the West as decadent and 
Islam as morally superior (Zanghellini 2010, p.271), and opens the door to Islamist 
                                                             
7 For the second generation the effect of being Eastern Orthodox remains, even if it is substantially smaller 
than for second generation Muslims. It should be noted that second generation Eastern Orthodox migrants 
primarily reside in Greece and Estonia and are part of quite distinct groups. In Greece, the majority have 
parents who were born in Turkey, and based on their older age profile are likely to be descendents of the 
population exchange between these countries in 1923. In Estonia, second generation Russians predominate 
amongst this group, and previous research has shown their greater religious identification and the continued 
importance of Russian identity for this group (Nimmerfeldt, 2008), which may contribute to the persistence of 
cultural values in this context. 
 
8
 Models not presented here also show that intra-generational acculturation, measured as length of residence, 
occurs for Muslim migrants to a similar extent as for migrants belonging to other religious denominations. 
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movements that ‘stress conformity to narrow norms, which they projects as both ‘natural’ and 
also scriptural’ (Al-Haqq Kugle 2010, p.270). That this pattern is most pronounced for 
Muslims rather than other minority religions seems to support this idea, although the 
heterogeneity of the ‘other’ category only allows tentative comparisons. While this study 
could show that individual factors together with origin country socialisation cannot explain 
fully the less supportive attitudes of Muslims, future research will be needed to determine 
more clearly the roots of these patterns as well as tracking future developments particularly 
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Appendix 1: Dependent and independent variables by immigrant group 






Dependent variable      
Attitudes towards homosexuality      
    Disagree strongly (%) 6.5 6.3 9.5 8.3 5.5 
    Disagree (%) 9.5 9.3 12.3 10.3 7.7 
    Neither (%) 15.4 15.5 15 17.2 13.7 
    Agree (%) 39.5 39.8 35.7 36.8 37.7 
    Agree strongly (%) 29.2 29.1 27.4 27.4 35.3 
Independent variables 
Individual level variables 
     
Religious denomination      
    Christian (%) 58.6 60.0 49.8 45.3 45.4 
    Muslim (%) 1.2 0.3 12.0 13.3 0.8 
    Other non-Christian (%) 0.6 0.4 3.2 1.9 0.7 
    No religion (%) 38.2 39.3 35.0 39.5 53.1 
Female (%) 53.1 53.0 54.0 50.9 53.4 
Age (in years) 47.0 47.3 46.0 41.1 43.5 
Educational level      
     Primary (%) 16.4 16.7 16.0 13.5 8.9 
     Lower secondary (%) 21.5 21.7 19.5 22.4 19.9 
     Upper secondary (%) 34.9 35.0 31.8 38.4 37.7 
     Tertiary (%) 27.2 26.6 32.7 25.7 33.5 
Income 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.7 
Marital status      
    Married (%) 54.1 54.1 59.5 44.2 45.9 
    Never married (%) 27.9 27.9 21.1 39.6 35.4 
    Divorced/separated (%) 9.2 8.8 11.9 9.9 12.2 
    Widowed (%) 8.9 9.1 7.4 6.3 6.5 
Place of residence      
    City (%) 19.1 18.2 28.4 27.9 21.7 
    Suburb (%) 12.5 12.2 15.2 14.6 14.1 
    Town (%) 31.0 30.8 31.9 34.5 32.7 
    Village (%) 31.1 32.0 21.8 21.0 27.6 
    Rural (%) 6.4 6.8 2.7 2.0 4.0 
Religiosity 4.7 4.7 5.3 5.1 4.2 
Religious attendance      
    Weekly(%) 15.4 15.7 15.5 14.6 9.2 
    Less than weekly (%) 51.3 51.1 53.7 54.6 49.4 
    Never (%) 33.3 33.2 30.8 30.6 41.3 
Prayer      
     Daily (%) 20.8 20.5 28.0 22.3 14.7 
     Weekly or more (%) 14.7 14.7 15.8 13.2 11.9 
     Less often (%) 27.8 27.8 27.9 30.1 26.9 
     Never (%) 36.8 37.1 28.3 34.5 46.6 
Length of residence (in years) n/a n/a 23.0 n/a n/a 
Community level variables      
Difference host-origin WVS n/a n/a 0.25 0.25 0.13 
Difference host-origin HDI 
 
n/a n/a 0.11 0.10 0.05 
Host country level variable      
Host country HDI 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87 
Case numbers 144,736 128,435 9,255 1,914 5,132 
Valid percentages reported 
 
 
